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Introduction 
Jerry Cohen’s important and trenchantly argued papers on equality and equal 
access to advantage have played a major role in shaping contemporary debates about 
equality and justice.
1 A central issue in his disagreements with John Rawls and 
Ronald Dworkin is the question of when individuals are properly held responsible for 
their choices, tastes and preferences. In this essay I will examine the ideas of 
responsibility that figure in the debate between Cohen and Rawls. My aim will be to 
determine how far Cohen disagrees with Rawls and what it is that they disagree 
about. 
Three questions can be at issue in this debate. The first is when and why 
justice demands some form of equality. The second is what kind of equality justice 
requires in various situations. The third is how the demands of equality can be 
modified by the choices individuals have made, or the opportunities to choose that 
they have had. 
The last of these questions can be subsumed within an answer to the second, 
and to a degree this is what happens in Cohen’s discussion: what individuals are 
                                                 
1 “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,” Ethics 99 (1989), pp. 906-944 (henceforth, 
Currency), and “Equality of What?” in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds., The 
Quality of Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 9-29 (henceforth, Equality). I 
will be discussing mainly these two articles, referring occasionally to Cohen’s more 
recent writings on these topics, in particular to “Expensive Taste Rides Again,” in Justine 
Burley, ed., Dworkin and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) (henceforth, Rides 
Again).   2
entitled to, on his view, is equal access to advantage. For purposes of analysis, 
however, it will be helpful to distinguish the two questions. Two theories might offer 
the same answer to the last question (the question of choice) while disagreeing about 
the second (about what it is that people should be able, by choosing correctly, to 
attain equal amounts of.) Or they might agree about what people should have access 
to equal amounts of, but disagree about what constitutes such access—about the kind 
of opportunities for choice that can render unequal shares legitimate. 
It is particularly helpful to keep in mind the independence of these three 
questions when one is arguing from examples. Faced with a case in which it seems 
just for people to have unequal shares of some good X, one can explain this by 
appealing to one’s answer to any of the three questions. One can say that this is not a 
case in which justice requires equality, or that what is required is not equality of X, or 
that the particular inequality in question is permitted because it results from a choice 
by the individual who has less. 
In regard to the first question, Cohen is not, in these articles, a strict 
egalitarian. He is making what he calls only a “weak equalisandum claim” about what 
is to be equalized insofar as equalization is defensible.
2 And he allows that equality 
may have to be balanced against other values (even, it seems, in determining what is 
just.) 
In regard to the second question (taken as distinct from the third), Cohen is 
not a welfarist—he does not hold that welfare, understood either as happiness or as 
preference satisfaction, is the thing that should (leaving choice aside) be equalized to 
                                                 
2 Currency, p. 908   3
the extent that anything should be equalized. Advantage, as he understands it, is “a 
heterogeneous collection of desirable states of the person reducible neither to his 
resources bundle nor to his welfare level.”
3 And he says that “in deciding both what 
qualifies as an advantage and the relative sizes of advantages, it is necessary to 
engage in objective assessment” rather than merely to take the answer given by the 
preferences of the individual in question.
4
Cohen takes equality of welfare as the starting point of his inquiry in both of 
these articles, but he is not wedded to this position. Faced with some cases in which 
justice does not seem to require equal levels of preference satisfaction, he responds in 
the second way described above, by moving away from pure welfarism and invoking 
a constraint on the preferences whose satisfaction is relevant to equality. Thus, for 
example, he agrees with Rawls’s observation that “offensive tastes” such as a 
preference that other people should suffer have no claim to satisfaction.
5
Cohen takes a different line, however, in response to examples of “expensive 
tastes” raised by Rawls and Dworkin. Rawls invites us to “Imagine two persons, one 
satisfied with a diet of milk, bread and beans, while the other is distraught without 
expensive wines and exotic dishes. In short, one has expensive tastes, the other does 
not.”
6 Equality of welfare would require that the latter person be given a larger 
income, or share of resources. Rawls holds that this is mistaken, and that justice is 
                                                 
3 Equality, p. 28. 
4Currency, p. 935. 
5Currency, p. 912. 
6Rawls, “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., 
Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 168.   4
achieved if the two have the same primary social goods. It is then up to them to 
decide whether to spend their income on luxuries. 
Given the pluralistic character of Cohen’s notion of “advantage,” it would be 
open to him to take a similar line. He might say that even though primary social 
goods are too restrictive a metric for distributive shares, a proper metric would not go 
so far as to include the degree to which a person’s taste for luxurious and expensive 
food is fulfilled. Cohen does not take this line, however. He says instead that a person 
who has expensive tastes should be compensated for the expense of satisfying them 
(or for the welfare loss of their not being satisfied) as long as these tastes “are not in 
some way traceable to the individual’s choices.” The proper response to cases of 
“expensive tastes”, he says, is not to move away from welfare to a more objective 
metric but to replace welfare with equality of opportunity for welfare.
7
There seem to be two reasons for this. The first, and more fundamental, reason 
is that although Cohen’s notion of advantage is not purely welfarist, preference 
satisfaction and states such as contentment and frustration play a significant role in 
this notion—certainly more significant than in Rawls’s theory, where they have no 
role at all. This is an important point of disagreement, which I will return to below. 
The second reason is that Cohen is unhappy with the way that Rawls and Dworkin 
invoke ideas of choice and responsibility, and he wants to explore this issue. I will 
begin by taking up this question. 
 
                                                 
7 Currency, p. 914. To be precise, the position he suggests we move to is equality of 
opportunity for advantage. But in the cases at hand it is opportunity for welfare, in either 
its hedonistic or preference satisfaction versions, that is at issue.   5
Rawls and Cohen on Responsibility for One’s Ends and Preferences 
Cohen quotes Rawls as follows on the subject of expensive tastes. 
 
As moral persons citizens have some part in forming and cultivating their 
final ends and preferences. It is not by itself an objection to the use of 
primary goods that it does not accommodate those with expensive tastes. 
One must argue in addition that it is unreasonable, if not unjust, to hold 
such persons responsible for their preferences and to require them to make 
out as best they can. But to argue this seems to presuppose that citizens’ 
preferences are beyond their control as propensities or cravings which 
simply happen. Citizens seem to be regarded as passive carriers of desires. 




Cohen considers two objections to what Rawls says here. First, he takes Rawls to 
be arguing that for purposes of answering questions of justice we need not take into 
account differences in the cost or difficulty of satisfying various preferences, because 
individuals can always avoid these costs by adopting different preferences. Cohen claims 
that this argument is invalid in many cases, because an individual’s preferences are not 
always under his or her control. Second, Cohen considers Nozick’s claim that what 
Rawls assumes here about individuals’ control over their preferences is inconsistent with 
                                                 
8Rawls, “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” pp. 168-169.   6
what he claims elsewhere about their lack of control over their dispositions to exert effort 
and strive to get ahead. I will consider each of these objections in turn. 
As regards the question of control, it should be noted that the class of “tastes and 
preferences” that are under consideration in this discussion is extremely diverse. In the 
first passage I quoted, Rawls considers a matter of taste in the most literal sense—
tendency to derive pleasure from certain foods. But he then goes on to speak of the 
control that agents have over their “ends” or their “final ends.” These cases differ in 
important respects, in particular in the kind of control that agents may be thought to have. 
Consider the differences between the following: 
 
(I)  What a person finds pleasant or unpleasant 
(II)  What a person sees as a reason for acting, thinking, or feeling a certain 
way 
(III)  The aims a person adopts and the actions he or she takes. 
 
States of the kind in group (I), such as tastes in food, are not chosen in any 
straightforward sense. But they are, to a degree, subject to modification over time. One 
can acquire a taste for something one does not like at first, and become accustomed to 
doing without other things that one has enjoyed and craved. Such changes often take 
place without our intending them, or even being aware that they occurring. But we can 
sometimes also bring them about by choosing to undergo a process that has this result. 
Group (II) includes both what seems to a person, spontaneously and 
unreflectively, to be a reason, and also what he or she judges on reflection to be one.   7
Ideally, an agent’s states of these two kinds will not conflict—what seems to a person to 
be a reason will conform to his or her reflective judgment. This does not always happen, 
however. For example, the fact that something would cause my rival acute discomfort 
can strike me as a reason to do it even though I firmly judge this to be a groundless, 
vindictive thought. 
In cases of this kind it is the unreflective response that strikes us as “recalcitrant,” 
because unresponsive the agent’s judgment. But none of the states in this group—neither 
the spontaneous nor the reflective ones—are directly subject to an agent’s will. It is up to 
an agent to judge what is or is not a reason, but not up to him or her to choose when this 
is so. Nonetheless, since all of these states either reflect an agent’s judgment or should be 
responsive to it they are all things that the agent is “responsible for” in one sense of that 
phrase: they are things he or she can be asked to defend and to modify in the light of 
criticism. In addition, what an agent sees, or does not see, as reasons is a central 
component of his or her moral character. So the states in group II are ones that an agent 
can be “held responsible for” in a further sense: they are characteristics on the basis of 
which he or she is subject to moral appraisal and moral criticism. The sense of 
responsibility at issue here is what I call responsibility as attributability.  
Although what seems to one to be a reason is not directly subject to one’s choice 
or will, such states are, like those in group I, subject to a degree to modification by 
training and habituation. In addition to whatever psychological limits there may on self-
manipulation of this kind, however, it is in this case subject to normative constraints as 
well. Because what seems to one to be a reason should, ideally, agree with what one 
judges to be a reason, there is something deviant about undertaking to modify these states   8
except to bring them into line with one’s judgment. So this is a further sense in which 
these attitudes are not “up to us” even though we are responsible (answerable) for them in 
the two ways I have mentioned. These states are an appropriate basis for moral appraisal 
simply because of the kind of states they are, not because they are under one’s control.
9
In contrast to those in groups I and II, items in group III (ends a person has 
adopted and actions she has decides to take) are objects of choice. We do not always 
choose the ends or actions that we judge to be supported by the best reasons, but insofar 
as we choose these things for reasons at all, the range of our choices is limited by facts 
about what strikes us as reasons—that is to say, by factors of the kinds in groups I and II, 
which are not themselves chosen (except perhaps in those limited cases of self-
manipulation.) Nonetheless, there sometimes remains a range of ends or courses of action 
each of which there is sufficient reason to adopt. (Perhaps these reasons are even equally 
good.) In such cases we may properly be said to choose among these eligible options. In 
such cases, in addition to being responsible (answerable, and liable to criticism) for our 
ends in the senses so far discussed, it is also true that we could have avoided having 
them, by choosing differently. But this is so only in this special class of cases. 
The term, ‘preference’, is sometimes used so broadly as to cover items in all three 
of the groups I have described: matters of taste, desires that involve seeing things as 
reasons (such as a desire for revenge), and ends that we have chosen. These things vary 
widely both in their objective importance and in the kinds of control we have over them. 
                                                 
9 The claims made in this paragraph and the preceding one are explained and defended 
more fully in Chapter 6 of my book, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1998) and in “Reasons and Passions,” in Sarah Buss and Lee 
Overton, eds., Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 165-183.   9
Cohen recognizes this diversity, but his examples tend to be concentrated near the “taste” 
end of this continuum. He considers, for example, someone who hates eggs, which are 
common, but loves fish, which is rarer and more expensive. He also discusses an example 
of Dworkin’s in which someone can’t stand the taste of ordinary water, and therefore 
wants bottled water, which is more expensive.
10 In each case, Cohen holds that these 
people should be compensated so that they will not suffer loss of welfare. 
Rawls might say here (or at least it would be reasonable for him to say) that, quite 
apart from the question of whether these tastes have been acquired voluntarily, or could 
be avoided, compensation is not in order because individuals’ relative levels of gustatory 
enjoyment are not part of the standard by which social institutions should be judged. 
Similarly, in response to Cohen’s example of “grumpy” people who get less enjoyment 
out of a given level of resources than others do, it could be said, correctly in my view, 
that making people cheerful is not one of the state’s jobs, and that the grumpy are entitled 
to special help only if they suffer from some medical condition. 
One response here would be for Cohen to agree that it is not the role of the state to 
promote equality in these experiential qualities, but then to say that his concern is not 
with what the role of the state should be, but with a more specific idea of what equality 
requires, which is only one of the many factors that go into determining what the state 
should do.
11 However, even if it were agreed that what we are concerned with is the 
assessment of political institutions, and that equality in hedonic states is not the 
responsibility of such institutions, this would not solve the problem Cohen raises for 
Rawls, which can be restated as a problem of expensive ends. One thing that basic 
                                                 
10 Rides Again, pp. 14-16. 
11 I will return to this question in the final section of the paper.    10
institutions surely should be judged on is their contribution to individuals’ ability to 
pursue their ends. Some ends are much more expensive (require much more in the way of 
resources) than others. So why doesn’t equality demand that those with expensive ends 
be given a larger share of resources than others receive, so that they can attain a similar 
level of success in fulfilling their life projects? 
It seems clear to me that equality does not require this. But how can this claim be 
defended? One thing that might be said is that, within the limits mentioned above, 
individuals have a choice about which ends to pursue. So they cannot complain if the 
ends they choose are more expensive than those of others. 
As Cohen correctly notes, however, it is not sufficient simply to appeal to the fact 
that individuals have a choice about which ends to adopt. One must defend the more 
complicated proposition that individuals can reasonably be asked to accept the 
consequences of these choices. This depends on many factors, including the severity of 
these consequences, the acceptability of the alternatives that the agent could have chosen, 
the meaning and importance for an agent of being able to make choices of this kind for 
him or herself, the conditions under which the choice was made, and the cost to others of 
providing individuals with better conditions for choosing or protecting agents against the 
adverse consequences of the choices they make.  
As Cohen writes,  
[T]he mere fact that you made a choice, and could have chosen otherwise (for 
example, not to buy that steak), no more shows that subsidy is out of order than 
does the mere fact that you could have chosen not to buy that wheelchair shows 
that subsidy is out of order. In each case, facts in the background to the choice,   11
facts about degrees of control, and about the cost of alternatives, affect the proper 
allocation of responsibility for the consequences of the choice.
12
I would put this point by saying that the claim that the state is not responsible for 
the extra expense of realizing a person’s ends is a judgment of substantive responsibility. 
This is distinct from the sense of responsibility I discussed above (responsibility as 
attributability), in which to claim that a person is responsible for a certain action is 
merely to claim that this action is attributable to him in the sense required for it to be a 
basis of moral assessment. The conclusion that a person is responsible, in this sense, for 
what she did leaves open what kind of appraisal, if any, is therefore in order—whether 
what the person did was praiseworthy, blameworthy, or morally neutral. In particular, the 
conclusion that a person was responsible, in this sense, for some action, does not make 
any claim about the duties or obligations of that person or others. 
By contrast, judgments of substantive responsibility are explicitly claims of this 
latter sort. So, for example, when we say that it is the responsibility of parents to see to it 
that their six year old children attend school, we mean that it is the parents who have a 
duty to do this, rather than, say, the children themselves, or some third party. And when 
we say that the cost of servicing and maintaining a car is the responsibility of the person 
who leases it, this means that this person, rather than the actual owner of the car, is 
obligated to provide that maintenance.  Such a judgment leaves it open whether, if a 
person fails to do what he is substantively responsible for doing, he is responsible for this 
failure the first sense of “responsible” that I distinguished. If, for example, parents fail to 
get their child to school because they are in a coma, then they are not responsible (open to 
                                                 
12 Rides Again, p. 42   12
moral criticism) for this failure even though it remains true that getting the child to school 
was their (substantive) responsibility. 
The fact that an action resulted from a person’s conscious choice may be 
sufficient to establish that that action can be attributed to her in the sense that is 
presupposed by moral appraisal. But a judgment of substantive responsibility depends on 
more than this. To justify the claim that a person who has done A has a certain obligation, 
or that someone who has done A has to bear the consequences (and that others are not 
obligated to share this burden) it is not enough to point out that this person chose to do A. 
One must also consider the costs that this assignment of responsibility imposes on a 
person who does A, the alternatives to A that are available to a person in this situation, 
and the implications, for this person and others, of assigning responsibility in some other 
way. 
The question of whether individuals are responsible for their ends in a sense that 
means that they have no claim to special aid if these ends are particularly expensive to 
pursue is thus a question of substantive responsibility. The point being made earlier was 
just that this question cannot be answered by merely appealing to the fact that agents are 
responsible for their ends in the sense of being properly asked to defend them, or properly 
subject to criticism (moral or other) for them, or even by merely appealing to the fact 
(when it is a fact) that agents choose their ends. Further argument is required to establish 
a claim of substantive responsibility. Cohen appears to be making this same point when 
he writes, 
   13
[I]t is false, on my view, that a person’s (unrepudiated) tastes are not the state’s 
business because it is reasonable to expect her to take responsibility for them, no 
matter how she came to have them, and no matter what she can do about them 
now. Instead, she must perforce pick up the tab for them because they cannot 
reasonably be the state’s business.
13
 
What I take Cohen to be saying here is that the claim that individuals are 
substantively responsible for (i.e., not entitled to compensation for) their tastes cannot be 
derived from a claim that they are responsible for their tastes in some prior sense of 
responsibility (such as responsibility as attributability.) I agree that such an argument is 
invalid. But I do not believe that Rawls is offering an argument of this kind in passages 
such as the one quoted above from “Social Unity and Primary Goods.” Rawls says that 
the conception of justice he proposes 
 
includes what we may call a social division of responsibility: society, the citizens 
as a collective body, accepts responsibility for maintaining equal basic liberties 
and fair equality of opportunity, and for providing a fair share of other primary 
social goods for everyone within this framework, while citizens (as individuals) 
and associations accept the responsibility for revising and adjusting their ends and 
aspirations in view of the all-purpose means they can expect …
14
 
                                                 
13 Rides Again, p. 36 
14 “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” p. 170.   14
In the terms I have been using, what Rawls is saying here is that his conception of 
justice is includes a certain judgment of substantive responsibility. This judgment, which 
assigns individuals responsibility for their own ends “is plausible only on certain 
assumptions” the first of which is that individuals can regulate and revise their ends.
15 
This is not an assumption that individuals are responsible for their ends in some prior 
sense, from which the propriety of the social division of responsibility that he proposes 
can be derived. It is merely an assumption about the capacities that individuals have. 
Moreover, Rawls says that “[b]y itself this assumption does not suffice.” The social 
division of responsibility that the use of primary social goods entails must be shown to be 
part of a workable and defensible conception of justice, and this involves taking into 
account other factors of the kind that Cohen and I have listed.  
So there is no disagreement between Cohen and Rawls about the kind of 
argument that needs to be offered for the relevant claims of responsibility. They do, 
however, appear to have substantive disagreements about which claims of this kind are 
correct. Rawls holds that individuals are responsible for (need not be compensated for) 
expensive tastes, whether or not these are chosen, and for expensive ends, which are 
under their control only to a degree. Cohen seems to disagree with these claims, or at 
least with the first of them. One advantage of the kind of argument that Cohen rightly 
rejects is that it might offer a way of settling this disagreement.  If we could establish, on 
some independent ground, that individuals are responsible for their preferences (perhaps 
simply because they have chosen them) then, using an argument of this form, we could 
conclude that justice does not require the state to compensate those with expensive tastes. 
                                                 
15 “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” p. 169.   15
But if such arguments are not valid, because judgments of substantive responsibility of 
the kind that form their conclusion depend on many factors, of which choice or control is 
only one, then it is more difficult to see how one can construct a decisive and non-
question-begging argument in support of a conclusion about the proper social division of 
responsibility. This is a large topic, but I will survey some of the possibilities. 
First, one might appeal to practical considerations, such as the difficulty and 
intrusiveness of having governments determine individuals’ levels of satisfaction, or to 
the (potentially unlimited?) costs of providing for the pursuit of ends that require 
expensive equipment, travel and other opportunities. Given these considerations, and the 
facts about choice mentioned above, wouldn’t our obligations to each other, and the 
demands of equality, be best fulfilled by providing each individual with the same set of 
goods and opportunities, to use in pursuing whatever ends he or she may choose? Rawls 
seems to appeal to such considerations when he speaks of the need to find “workable 
criteria for interpersonal comparisons.”
16 And Cohen seems to endorse this kind of 
argument as well, when he writes that 
The right argument says: it is extremely difficult and/or unacceptably intrusive to 
determine whether a person’s tastes are expensive and how much she is 
responsible for them; therefore the state cannot and/or should not seek to make 
determinations of that sort; therefore people must (on the whole) take 
responsibility for the costs of their tastes.
17
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Rides Again, p. 46.   16
So there is general agreement on the relevance of this line of argument, but it remains 
somewhat inclusive. How much practical difficulty or “intrusiveness” is enough to justify 
the conclusion that compensation for expensive tastes is “not the states business”? 
An alternative would be to argue from examples, using the method of reflective 
equilibrium. Since there is disagreement about the examples, an important part of this 
strategy, on Rawls’s side, would consist trying to undermine the force of examples that 
are cited in support of the claim that people whose ends are expensive should receive 
compensation. Three examples that Cohen cites are: a person who finds the taste of 
ordinary water “gagging,” a person who cannot stand eggs but lives in a place where fish 
and eggs are the only available nutrients and fish is much more expensive, and a person 
who cannot perform ordinary physical movements without pain. In each case, Cohen 
believes that equality requires that people be “compensated” for these special difficulties. 
It seems to me that special treatment may be called for some of in these cases. 
The question is why this is so, and what general conclusion is to be drawn. Although 
these cases literally involve tastes, or receptivity to pleasant and unpleasant feelings, it is 
somewhat misleading to describe them as cases of “expensive tastes.” The people in these 
examples do not have unusual tastes. They want the same things that everyone wants: 
nourishment, hydration, and the ability to move freely. The normative force of the 
examples derives from the objective importance of these interests, rather than from the 
value of satisfying special tastes or preferences. The problem these people have is that 
they cannot pursue these quite ordinary aims without pain, or gagging, or feelings of 
disgust. What they need is help in overcoming these obstacles. This help might be 
provided by giving them water or food that they like better, or money to buy it. But it   17
could just as well be given by providing access to medical treatment. “Compensation” is 
therefore a somewhat misleading term for what is required, since the point is to enable 
the people to have these essential things without difficulty, not simply to raise their level 
of welfare (understood hedonistically or in terms of preference satisfaction.) Understood 
in this way, these cases are analogous to those of individuals who live far from the 
available supply of drinkable water, or who cannot get it themselves because of chronic 
weakness. What these people are entitled to is transportation, or special water supplies, 
not compensation. 
These examples may show that equality is not always attained by giving people 
the same shares of primary social goods, and therefore that primary social goods are too 
narrow a standard. They may thus support some form of what Cohen calls “midfare,” 
rather than primary social goods, as a basis for making judgments of justice.
18 But they 
do not provide intuitive support for the idea that people who have expensive tastes should 
receive compensation to raise their level of hedonic tone or preference satisfaction. 
These examples (at least the first two) could be understood in a somewhat 
different way, as cases in which what is at issue is simply gustatory pleasure. (We might 
alter them in order to support this interpretation, for example by supposing that, rather 
than having difficulty gagging down eggs, the person just finds them boring.) Understood 
in this way the examples would, if accepted, support the idea of compensation for 
expensive tastes. But when they are understood in this way the examples seem, to me at 
least, to lose their force. They seem retain their force while also leading to the desired 
conclusion only by exploiting an ambiguity between these two readings. 
                                                 
18 See Equality, pp. 18ff.   18
Another example that Cohen discusses involves a person who enjoys photography 
but not fishing and finds that, because fishing is so much more popular, photography 
equipment is vastly more expensive. He believes that compensation is called for to cover 
this extra expense. This case involves something properly called an expensive end. But I 
have to say that I do not find the case for compensation compelling. What we have here 
are two versions of the same interest; having an agreeable leisure activity. As long as 
each person is provided with the same resources (money and time, say) to pursue this 
interest, it seems to me that the demands of equality are fulfilled. Things would be 
different if support for leisure pursuits were provided in kind, and the government 
provided only fishing poles (or golf clubs.) This would be objectionably unequal 
treatment. But as long as the rest of us are making the same sacrifice to provide the same 
malleable resources to others the fact that these go farther to support some pursuits than 
they do to support others does not make them objectionably unequal. 
 
Are Rawls’s Claims about Responsibility Inconsistent? 
Cohen observes that the claim Rawls makes about individuals’ responsibility for 
their tastes and their final ends seems inconsistent with what he says about holding 
individuals responsible for their willingness to exert themselves in order to develop their 
talents and succeed in a competitive society. Cohen writes, 
 
The problem is that the picture of the individual as responsibly guiding his own 
taste formation is hard to reconcile with claims Rawls elsewhere uses in a 
fundamental way to support his egalitarianism. I have in mind the skepticism   19
which he expresses about extra reward for extra effort: “The effort a person is 
willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills and the alternatives 
open to him. The better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to strive 
conscientiously, and there seems to be no way to discount for their greater good 
fortune. The idea of rewarding desert is impracticable.”
19
 
As Cohen notes, Robert Nozick leveled a similar charge of inconsistency against 
Rawls. Referring to the passage from Rawls quoted by Cohen, Nozick says,  
 
Denigrating a person’s autonomy and prime responsibility for his actions is a 
risky line to take for a theory that otherwise wishes to buttress the dignity and 
self-respect of autonomous beings … One doubts that the unexalted picture of 
human beings Rawls’ theory presupposes and rests upon can be made to fit 
together with the view of human dignity it is designed to lead to and embody.
20
 
Nozick’s remark has considerable rhetorical force. But in referring to “the dignity 
and respect of autonomous beings” he is painting with a rather broad brush. Rawls’s 
theory seeks to “buttress” autonomy mainly by arguing for the importance of the basic 
liberties and other background institutions that provide the conditions necessary for 
individuals to form and pursue their own conceptions of the good. Urging the importance 
                                                 
19 Currency, p. 914. The passage quoted from Rawls is from A Theory of Justice 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 312 (Rev. Edn., p. 274) 
20 Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974) p. 214.   20
of maintaining these conditions is scarcely inconsistent with recognizing that there are 
other conditions under which individuals are less able to make meaningful choices.
21
Cohen’s criticism of Rawls on this point is much more carefully drawn than 
Nozick’s. What he takes Rawls’s claims about effort to be in tension with is not a general 
ideal of dignity and autonomy but rather Rawls’s specific claims about responsibility for 
one’s tastes. He points out that Nozick overstates the claim Rawls is making in the 
passage about desert to which Cohen and Nozick both refer. In that passage, Rawls is not 
claiming that individuals can claim no credit for their decisions about whether to exert 
themselves to develop their talents because these decisions are influenced by their 
abilities and their family circumstances. Rather, Cohen says, Rawls claim is only that, to 
the degree that individuals’ choices are due to these factors they do not constitute moral 
desert, and that it is impracticable to determine the degree to which this is so. But, Cohen 
asks, if individuals’ responsibility for exerting themselves is in this way a matter of 
degree, why isn’t their responsibility for the tastes they develop also a matter of degree, 
depending on the degree to which this is a matter of choice and the degree to which it 
reflects outside constraints and influences? 
Even this more carefully drawn charge of inconsistency misses the mark, 
however. Both Cohen and Nozick seem to assume that in the passage about desert and 
                                                 
21 Nozick is here relying on a distinctively libertarian view according to which respect for 
individual autonomy (or “liberty”) requires two things: (1) not interfering with 
individual’s choices in certain specified ways (by force or fraud) and (2) treating all 
choices that individuals make in the absence of these interferences as morally binding. 
Given this view, it may appear that Rawls is claiming to be a defender of autonomy while 
at some points failing to respect it, by violating (2). But this is not inconsistency on 
Rawls’s part, since he rejects this libertarian premise. One of his main points is that 
individual autonomy is respected by providing conditions under which it can be 
meaningfully exercised, not by holding individuals responsible for the choices they make 
under unfavorable conditions.   21
effort that they both quote Rawls is arguing against the idea of rewarding people in 
proportion to the effort they put forth. Elsewhere in A Theory of Justice Rawls does argue 
against this idea (although he also offers a qualified defense), and I will return to this 
argument shortly. But what Rawls is arguing against in the passage quoted by Cohen and 
Nozick is the different idea that economic reward should be proportional to desert, or 
moral worth. 
This argument is part of Rawls’s larger strategy of showing that his two principles 
of justice fit with our considered judgments about justice in reflective equilibrium. Even 
if these principles are supported by the argument from the Original Position, if they were 
in direct conflict with our considered judgments about justice, then we would need to 
consider whether to modify or abandon these judgments or to modify or abandon the 
principles and the Original Position construction that yields them. Large parts of A 
Theory of Justice are thus devoted to the task of showing that various conflicts of this 
kind should be resolved in favor of the two principles of justice—that is to say, to arguing 
that various judgments that have some intuitive appeal but conflict with Rawls’s two 
principles of justice do not stand the test of reflection and should be modified or 
abandoned. 
In §12, for example, Rawls considers the idea that individuals are entitled to 
whatever they would receive in a free market (a “system of natural liberty”) and argues 
that this should not, on reflection, be counted as a considered judgment. In §47 Rawls 
considers various “common sense precepts of justice” such as the ideas that justice 
requires reward in accord with contribution (marginal productivity), or in proportion to 
effort, or in proportion to need. These familiar precepts are not fundamental principles of   22
justice on Rawls’s view, but in §47 he tries to account for them by explaining how they 
can properly play a role in our thinking about justice at a more derivative level, as 
responses to questions about distribution that arise under special, but not uncommon, 
conditions within a just society. So, for example, the idea of reward according to effort 
has a role in a society governed by Rawls’s Difference Principle in the form of the 
argument that extra compensation should be offered to defray costs of training and to 
compensate people for performing particularly onerous and unpleasant tasks.  
In §48 Rawls takes a firmer line with regard to the idea that economic reward 
should be distributed according to moral desert. This idea, he argues in the last part of 
this section, does not stand up under reflection, and should be rejected. Earlier in §48, 
however, he points out that none of the common sense precepts of justice discussed in 
§47 would require economic reward to track moral desert. His aim here is to show how 
the idea of reward according to desert differs from these common sense precepts, thus 
depriving that idea of the support it might derive from them. 
The common sense precept that might seem to come closest to requiring reward in 
proportion to moral worth, Rawls says, is the precept of distribution according to effort. It 
is in this context that we encounter the passage Cohen and Nozick discuss, in which 
Rawls says, “the effort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities 
and skills and the alternatives open to him. The better endowed are more likely, other 
things equal, to strive conscientiously, and there seems to be no way to discount for their 
greater good fortune.” Therefore, he concludes, “the idea of rewarding desert is 
impracticable.”
22 Rawls’s point here is not that reward should not be proportioned to 
                                                 
22 A Theory of Justice, p. 312 (Rev. Edn., p. 274).   23
effort because differences in the degree of effort that people put forth is due in part to 
differences in ability and in family circumstances. It is rather that because effort is 
influenced by these factors differences in effort do not correspond to differences in moral 
worth. So in proportioning reward to effort we would not be rewarding moral worth, and 
it would be “impracticable” to design institutions that would identify and reward those 
differences in effort that do reflect differences in moral worth. I don’t see any 
inconsistency between what Rawls says in this passage and what he says about the 
capacity to modify one’s ends. 
Earlier in the book, however, Rawls makes another remark about effort that may 
seem to be in tension with the idea of responsibility for one’s ends. This remark occurs in 
§12 in the context of an argument against what Rawls calls the liberal conception of 
justice. This conception holds that a distribution is just if it is produced by a free market 
under conditions of “fair equality of opportunity.” Fair equality of opportunity, as Rawls 
defines it, is the strong requirement that “those who are at the same level of talent and 
ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects of 
success regardless of their initial place in the social system, that is, irrespective of the 
income class into which they are born.”
23
Rawls offers two objections to the liberal conception, the second of which is that 
given the background of an unregulated free market, fair equality of opportunity “can be 
only imperfectly carried out, at least as long as the institution of the family exists.” This 
is so, he says, because 
                                                 
23 A Theory of Justice, p. 73 (Rev. Edn., 63).   24
The extent to which natural capacities develop and reach fruition is affected by all 
kinds of social conditions and class attitudes. Even the willingness to make an 
effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon 
happy family and social circumstances. It is impossible in practice to secure equal 
chances of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed, and therefore we 
may want to adopt a principle which recognizes this fact and also mitigates the 
arbitrary effects of the natural lottery.
24
 
The general point that Rawls is making here is that the liberal conception purports 
to combine elements that are in fact incompatible with one another. Fair equality of 
opportunity cannot be achieved simply by adding on to a market system something like a 
legal requirement of non-discrimination, because the inequality in family wealth and 
income that an unregulated market will produce guarantees inequality in the opportunity 
to develop one’s talents. 
The requirement of fair equality of opportunity specifies that individuals with (a) 
the same level of talent and ability and (b) the same willingness to use these should have 
the same chances of success whatever income class they are born into. These two clauses 
correspond to two justifications that might be offered to an individual who complains 
about having a smaller share of income of wealth than some others do. One thing one 
might say to such a person, corresponding to clause (a), is that the others have been given 
more because they have a talent or ability which he lacks. (If this is to be a good 
response, the relevant “talent or ability” must be something that there is a good 
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justification for rewarding with special opportunities or benefits. I will take this to be 
understood.) 
A second response, corresponding to clause (b), is that although the individual in 
question has the same talent or ability he has not been willing to develop and use it in the 
way that justifies reward. The force of this response is, “You can’t complain, because you 
were put in as good a position as you could ask for to develop talents that would have 
qualified for reward and you failed to do so.” But, Rawls argues, whether people have 
been put in such a position depends on whether they have been provided with the “happy 
family and social circumstances” that are required in order to stimulate the development 
of talent in early childhood. His remark about being “deserving in the ordinary sense” can 
be understood in this same way. If an individual’s family and social circumstances were 
very unfavorable, then we cannot say that her failure to develop her talents shows her to 
be undeserving of reward “in the ordinary sense.” That is to say, it does not show that she 
failed to take advantage of a fair opportunity to succeed. Moral worth is not here at issue. 
This argument is quite consistent with what Rawls says about responsibility for 
one’s ends. Both arguments involve the idea that if an outcome results from a choice that 
an individual has made under conditions for making that choice that are as good as he 
could ask for, then he cannot complain about that outcome—it is “his responsibility.”  
But everything depends on the conditions mentioned in the crucial italicized phrase. 
What Rawls is saying in the passage I have been discussing is that under the “liberal 
conception” there is no assurance that the conditions under which individuals decide 
whether to exert themselves, or to develop their talents, will be good enough to give these 
decisions legitimating force. What he is saying in his defense of primary social goods is   26
that in a well-ordered society governed by his two principles of justice these conditions 
will be good enough, and that individuals can therefore reasonably be asked to accept 
responsibility for the ends they adopt. One can dispute this latter claim, but it is not 
inconsistent with the former one. 
 
Where Do Cohen and Rawls Disagree? 
I have said several times that Cohen and Rawls appear to disagree about whether 
people should be compensated if their tastes are particularly difficult to satisfy. They 
certainly disagree insofar as they are talking about the same thing. There is, however, 
some reason to think that they are not always talking about the same thing. This makes it 
more difficult than one might have expected to be clear about the exact nature of their 
disagreement. 
Rawls proposes the notion of primary social goods as what I will call a “metric”: 
a measure of distributive shares for use within a conception of justice. The role of a 
conception of justice as Rawls understands it is to serve as a shared standard that the 
members of a society can use to assess the basic institutions of their society and to 
adjudicate claims that individuals make about the way they should be treated by those 
institutions. A metric is one component of such a shared standard: a workable basis for 
comparing distributive shares. 
To claim that primary social goods, or any other measure, is the appropriate 
metric for a conception of justice is therefore not necessarily to defend it as a conception 
of well-being.
25 The choice of a metric depends on claims about the proper role of the 
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state (of “basic institutions”) and about what can serve as a workable public standard for 
comparing the circumstances of different individuals. Claims about individual well being 
depend on neither of these things. The pleasure that a person gets from eating and the 
enjoyment he derives from leisure activities are among the components of his well-being. 
But it is quite coherent to accept that this is so while claiming that the proper metric for 
purposes of justice should ignore these things, because these elements of well-being are 
not directly the concern of the state, and perhaps also because these pleasures are so 
difficult to assess and compare that they could not form part of a workable public 
standard. 
Consider now the following remark of Cohen’s: 
A word about what will be meant by the sentence-form “x represents and 
injustice’ here. It will not mean ‘x represents an injustice that ought to be 
rectified by the state.’ (No one should in any case think that that’s what ‘x 
represents an injustice’ ordinarily means: the words ‘that ought to be 
rectified by the state’ surely add meaning to the phrase that they expand.) 
It will mean, more elementarily, that the world is less than fully just by 
virtue of the presence of x in it. So, to be as clear as possible, if, in the 
sequel, I say such things as ‘compensation is required by egalitarian 
justice,’ I mean: for there to be egalitarian justice, there must be 
compensation; and not: there must (unconditionally) be compensation, 
because of the (unoverridable and always implementable) requirements of 
egalitarian distributive justice.
26
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 The first four sentences of this passage seem to suggest that “egalitarian justice” 
as Cohen understands it is concerned with how the world should be rather than with what 
social institutions should be like. If this is correct, it significantly reduces the 
disagreement between him and Rawls, for whom the question of justice just is a question 
about the basic institutions of society. If the intuitive judgments about when 
compensation is due that Cohen’s examples are meant to elicit are not judgments about 
when a just state should pay compensation, then it is not clear that they are relevant to the 
question that Rawls is addressing. 
The final sentence of the passage, however, suggests a different interpretation. On 
this reading, egalitarian justice, as Cohen understands it, is about what a just state should 
do other things being equal. But, since other things than egalitarian justice go into 
determining what a state (even a just one?) should do, it does not follow from the fact that 
egalitarian justice demands compensation in a given kind of case that a state ought to 
provide it. On this interpretation, both Rawls and Cohen are talking about the state, but 
the metrics they are proposing are intended for different uses. Primary social goods are 
intended by Rawls to be used in principles that describe what justice requires institutions 
to be like all things considered. The equalisandum that Cohen is looking for, however, is 
only intended for use in answering the more restricted question of what egalitarian justice 
requires. 
I imagine that Cohen also disagrees with Rawls about some all things considered 
claims—that he believes that a just state should actually provide compensation in some 
cases in which Rawls believes this is not required. But the primary focus of his argument   29
is on the narrower question of what egalitarian justice requires. This makes it somewhat 
difficult to assess the force of examples in this argument, since in interpreting them one 
must ask what kind of judgment they are meant to support: a judgment concerning 
Rawls’s idea of justice as the very inclusive “first virtue of social institutions,” or a 
judgment dealing only with Cohen’s narrower, and to my mind at least, more elusive idea 
of what “egalitarian justice” requires. 
To conclude: Rawls and Cohen agree about the kind of case that needs to be made 
to support the conclusion that individuals are appropriately held responsible for certain 
choices, ends or preferences. So in this respect there is more agreement between them 
than might at first appear. They may, of course, disagree in particular cases about 
whether an adequate case of this kind can be made. But it is sometimes difficult to 
determine how far they disagree because they are addressing slightly different questions, 
Rawls being concerned with the overall justice of social institutions, Cohen with an idea 
of egalitarian justice which is not the only consideration bearing on what the state should 
do. 